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The Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.1 has generated much discussion of defamation law and its
constitutional limitations. 2 Commentators have criticized or de-
fended the decision and its implications according to their own
perceptions of which of the conflicting interests involved-pro-
tection of individual reputation or freedom of speech and press-
should prevail.3 It is not my intent to dwell on issues already
discussed or to criticize directly the arguments of others. Rath-
er, I will focus on the most important aspects of Gertz and Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,4 the Supreme Court's most recent defamation-
first amendment decision, in order to present a clear analysis of
current constitutional policy in the critical area of freedom of
expression.
The Court in Gertz and Firestone claimed to strike a new
balance between the two policies of protecting individual reputa-
tion, on the one hand, and safeguarding first amendment
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tnx. L.
REV. 422 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Anderson, Press Self-Censorship];
Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of
Press Power, 54 TEx. L. REv. 271 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Anderson,
Control of Press Power]; Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz
v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment,
26 HAsINGs L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,
61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1975); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom
of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1221 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and
the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX.
L. REV. 199 (1976).
3. Compare Robertson, supra note 2 (praising Gertz for its protec-
tion of the individual from media irresponsibility) with Anderson, Press
Self-Censorship, supra note 2, and Anderson, Control of Press Power, su-
pra note 2 (criticizing Gertz for its negative effect on the press).
4. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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freedoms, on the other.5 Careful scrutiny of the decisions,
however, reveals what appears to be a conscious determination
by the Court to limit what can safely be published or broadcast.
While purporting merely to enhance the protection of private
individuals caught up in matters of public interest, the Court
appears to have utilized libel law to implement a third policy:
control of media power and influence by forcing media self-
censorship.6
In order to understand the subtle, yet powerful, impact of
Gertz and Firestone, the constitutional history of libel law must
be briefly analyzed. This Article will then examine the Su-
preme Court's articulated rationale for its change in position
and will consider whether the media were actually given
the protection the Court purported to provide. Finally, the
Article will demonstrate that the combination of several factors
in the cases-the approval of a negligence standard for private
plaintiffs, the narrow definition of "public figure," and the
refusal to grant special protection to reports of judicial proceed-
ings-indicates, consistent with the general socio-political con-
servatism of the present Court, 7 the emergence of a new policy
of media censorship. This policy is intended to restrict media
5. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1976); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
6. Professor Anderson also believes that the changes in libel law
occasioned by Gertz result in unacceptable control of the press. Ander-
son, Press Self-Censorship, supra note 2; Anderson, Control of Press
Power, supra note 2. For the view that modern libel law serves "the
interest in securing responsibility in dissemination of information," see
Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Re-
vised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 582 (1964).
7. Gertz appears to exhibit the same conservative socio-political
policy toward freedom of the press that the Burger Court has displayed
in other contexts. The Court has manifested this conservatism most
conspicuously in its criminal procedure decisions. Recent Burger Court
decisions have, for example, limited the applicability of the exclusionary
rule, see United States v. Donovan, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974), and validated questionable police search and
seizure practices under the fourth amendment, see South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court has also re-
stricted the operative effect of the Miranda rules, see United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1976); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and cut back on
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see Andreson v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
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coverage to matters of immediate political relevance, that is, to
matters involving persons with present or potential political
impact. This restriction will effectively limit the information
available to the public and could ultimately reduce the influence
of the media in American society. As a consequence, freedom of
expression will be curtailed.
II. NEW YORK TIMES AND ITS PROGENY:
THE LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
A. THE DECISIONS
Prior to 1964, when the Supreme Court decided New York
(1976); Ritchie, Compulsion Which Violates the Fifth Amendment:
The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MwN. L. REv. 383 (1977). Similarly,
it has limited the sixth amendment right to counsel. See Ross v. Moffet,
417 U.S. 600 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Outside the sphere of criminal procedure the Burger Court has also
tended to interpret restrictively other constitutional protections. A note-
worthy example of its perspective is Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), a 6-3 affirmance, without opin-
ion or oral argument, of a three-judge federal district court decision
upholding the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy statute. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975). The plaintiffs, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claimed
that, as applied to private homosexual conduct between consenting
adults, the statute violated their constitutional right to privacy. In
affirming the three-judge court, the Supreme Court reversed a ten-
year trend of granting increasing protection to privacy claims, again sig-
naling its conservative stance toward certain matters of social and politi-
cal concern. The Court's most recent decisions in sex discrimination suits
also suggest that the era of increased judicial protection for women may
be ending. See Mathews v. De Castro, 97 S. Ct. 431 (1976) (denial of
social security benefits to divorced woman with child in her care held
not a violation of equal protection); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S.
Ct. 401 (1976) (employer's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
from its disability income protection plan does not violate Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibition). In its treatment of freedom of the press
issues, the Burger Court's philosophical bent is evident by its withdrawal
of some protection for the media and curtailment of freedom of the press.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison regulations prohibiting
all interviews between the press and specific inmates do not violate first
amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene material
is not protected by the first amendment); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972) (first amendment does not provide a testimonial privilege for
a newspaper reporter that would allow him to refuse to reveal his sources
of information regarding criminal activity); Anderson, Press Self-Cen-
sorship, supra note 2, at 451-52.
The most notable exception to the Court's apparently restrictive so-
cio-political policy is its abortion decisions. See, e.g., Sendak v. Arnold,
97 S. Ct. 476 (1976) (summary affirmance); Planned Parenthood of Cen-




Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 a publisher, broadcaster, or speaker could
be held strictly liable for the publication or utterance of a
defamatory falsehood, unless he could show that the statement
was privileged. In New York Times,'0 the Court constitution-
alized the common law privilege of fair comment," holding that
the freedoms of speech and press' 2
require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'3
Although this decision was limited to public officials, the
Court broadened the application of the constitutional malice
standard in 1967 in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts' 4 and Associated Press v. Walker,15 both of which
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW oar ToRTs § 5.5, at 364 (1956);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 113, at 772-73 (4th ed.
1971).
10. The plaintiff was the elected Commissioner of Public Affairs in
Montgomery, Alabama. He sued four black Alabama clergymen and the
New York Times, alleging that a paid political advertisement in the New
York Times describing unlawful activities by Montgomery police neces-
sarily defamed him as supervisor of the police department. 376 U.S. at
256.
11. The common law privilege of "fair comment" protected the hon-
est expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest, as long
as the statements made were not factually inaccurate. The privilege was
applicable to criticisms of public officials of all levels and rank
from the President of the United States on down to the humblest
municipal officer, to candidates for public office, to those in
charge of public institutions, and to criticism of literary, artistic,
scientific, dramatic productions and performances of various
sorts submitted for public approval.
1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 9, § 5.28, at 456-57. Only statements of
opinion were protected; the privilege was not usually extended to fac-
tual errors, PROSSER, supra note 9, § 118, at 819-20, although a small
number of jurisdictions protected factual inaccuracies if the misstatement
was not malicious, see, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P.
281 (1908). In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
Supreme Court constitutionalized this minority view of the privilege.
The Court, however, adopted a more stringent definition of malice than
the common law standard of ill will, spite, or bad or corrupt motive.
See text accompanying note 13 infra.
12. The first amendment applies to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975), which creates the conflict between freedom of
expression and state libel laws; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
13. 376 U.S. at 279-80.




involved libel actions brought by public figures16 against media
defendants. There was no majority opinion, but five members of
the Court agreed that at least the "actual malice" rule should
cover all public persons, public figures as well as public offi-
cials.17
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' was the logical culmina-
tion of the Court's progressively expansive application of the
first amendment to libel litigation. Instead of focusing on the
status of the plaintiff, the Court emphasized the nature of the
subject matter discussed in the allegedly libelous statement, 9
and extended the New York Times malice standard to any
statement about an issue of public interest.20 Thus, after Ro-
senbloom, even a private person who became involved in a
matter of general or public interest had to show knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to recover for defama-
tion.
16. Wally Butts, the plaintiff in Curtis Publishing Co. was, at
the time of the article in question, athletic director at the University
of Georgia. Although Georgia is a state university, Butts was employed
by the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation. Id. at 135.
The plaintiff in Associated Press was Edwin A. Walker, a retired
Army officer, who was adamantly opposed to federal intervention in the
integration process in the South. As a result of his political activ-
ities, Walker had gathered a following known as the "Friends of Walker"
and had gained some political prominence. Id. at 140.
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), was a plural-
ity opinion; no majority was able to agree on what standard to apply
to "public figures." Justice Harlan, in an opinion in which Justices
Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joined, wrote that public figures could recover
"on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. Chief Justice Warren,
joined by Justices Brennan and White, would have applied the New York
Times standard, while Justices Black and Douglas reaffirmed the posi-
tion they had taken in New York Times that the first amendment pro-
vided the media with absolute immunity from liability for defamation.
Thus, five Justices favored at least applying the New York Times test
to public figures, and the Court has indicated in subsequent opinions
that this was in effect the holding of the case. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974). See also Greenbelt Coop. Pub-
lishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
18. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom was an action by a distributor
of nudist magazines against a local radio station which had broadcast
a story on the plaintiff's arrest for obscenity.
19. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
20. Although Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom spoke only
for a plurality of three, the reasoning of Justices Black and Douglas that
the first amendment provides the media with absolute immunity from
liability for defamation would also support the holding. See Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., joined
1977]
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Knowledge of falsity was an unambiguous standard; 21 the
only nebulous aspect of the test was recklessness. The Court,
however, provided clear guidance to state tribunals by indicating
that "reckless disregard for the truth [was] not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or
would have investigated before publishing," 22 but rather, by
whether "[t]here [was] sufficient evidence to permit the con-
clusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication. ''23 This definition of "reckless
disregard" complemented the "actual malice" standard, providing
a stringent test to protect the media24 from self-imposed censor-
ship caused by the threat of libel litigation.25
by Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 79-83 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring; Doug-
las, J., joined by Black, J., concurring); New York Times v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J.,'joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
21. Whenever a plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of evi-
dence that the defendant-publisher probably knew his statements were
untrue, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. See Indianapolis Newspapers,
Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930
(1970).
22. 403 U.S. at 56 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968)).
23. Id.
24. In this Article I am primarily concerned with freedom of the
press. It can be persuasively argued, however, that the New York Times
line of cases, although dealing with media defendants, should also apply
to individual speakers, since the first amendment protects freedom
of speech as well as freedom of the press. This would leave only
private defamation involving matters of no public interest unprotected
by the first amendment. But see Stewart, Or Of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 633-35 (1975), in which Justice Stewart argues that immunity
from liability for defamation is designed to protect only the press as an
institution and not the individual speaker.
25. Altogether, the Court decided 12 cases between New York
Times and Gertz, interpreting and applying the constitutional privilege.
They are, in order of decision: Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
The Court also applied the knowing or reckless falsity test to pri-
vacy cases. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), it held that the
plaintiffs could not recover for an invasion of privacy based on falsifica-
tion unless they satisfied the New York Times "actual malice" standard.
Their action, although based on false statements, was not one for defama-
tion, because the inaccuracies were actually laudatory. First amendment
protection is not restricted to cases of falsification but extends to other
[Vol. 61:645
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B. THE POLICY: BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The Supreme Court's extension of the constitutional malice
standard to all publications and statements of public interest
indicates that, in this line of decisions, it resolved the conflict
between individual reputation and privacy 26 and the first amend-
ment by giving paramount consideration to freedom of speech 27
and press. Although the Court did not hold that all discussions
of public matters were absolutely privileged,28 it recognized that
the common law defense of truth inadequately protected free-
dom of the press: "[E] rroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and ... it must be protected if the freedoms of expres-
sion are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to
survive.' "29
If truth were the only defense to libel, publishers would
be deterred not only from making false statements but truthful
forms of privacy actions as well, such as "public disclosure of private
facts." See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
O'Hilderbrandt v. CBS, 40 Cal. App. 3d 323, 114 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1974);
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 35, 37-38, 459 P.2d 912, 923-24, 81 Cal. Rptr.
360, 371-72 (1969); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 App. Div. 2d 196, 199, 311
N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (1970); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23
N.Y.S.2d 771, 782, 244 N.E.2d 250, 258, 296 N.Y.S.2d 341, 353 (1968).
It is difficult to devise a workable first amendment standard for such
cases, since the absence of falsification makes knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth an inappropriate test. See Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
If, however, the facts disclosed are of public record, their publication is
absolutely protected from an action based on invasion of privacy. Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
26. Many cases of defamation also include a cause of action for in-
vasion of privacy, especially when the party aggrieved is a private in-
dividual. See note 25 supra.
27. Even if the New York Times line of cases do not protect an
individual speaker, see note 24 supra, freedom of the press is intertwined
with free speech, for the media supply the public with the information
necessary to exercise freedom of speech effectively. Therefore, infringe-
ment of freedom of the press indirectly infringes free speech. Cf. Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
122 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
28. Only Justices Black and Douglas found in the first amendment
an absolute privilege against a defamation action resulting from the dis-
cussion of public matters. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964)
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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ones as well. If a publisher was uncertain that he could prove
the truth of a story to a jury's satisfaction, or if he did not
want to undergo the expense of having to do so, the common
law defense of truth would force him "to make only statements
which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' "30
Realizing the ambiguity of the standard of reasonable
care,31 the Court rejected a negligence criterion for similar rea-
sons. Because the press could not gauge exactly how a jury
would evaluate its attempts to verify a story's accuracy, it would
resort to self-censorship,3 2 suppressing accurate, newsworthy in-
formation that could not be indisputably verified before publi-
cation. This would avoid the possibility of liability based on a
jury's retrospective determination that the defendant had failed
to exercise reasonable care. As the Court stated in Rosen-
bloom, "it is not simply the possibility of a judgment for dam-
ages which results in self-censorship. The very possibility of
having to engage in litigation . .. is threat enough."33
The "actual malice" rule was adopted as the only work-
able standard that would- both allow recovery for intentional
or reckless defamation and effectively protect the media from
self-censorship precipitated by the threat of litigation and large
damage awards.34 Striking this balance between individual rep-
30. Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
31. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
32. Id.
33. 403 U.S. at 52-53.
34. Unlike Professor Anderson, I believe that the knowing or reck-
less falsity standard adequately protects the media from self-censor-
ship induced by potential libel actions. Professor Anderson contended
that because the New York Times malice standard only becomes signifi-
cant as a jury instruction, after a major portion of defense costs have
been incurred, the expense of defending a libel action fosters media self-
censorship. Citing an article from Juris Doctor, he asserted that defense
costs of a "full-fledged libel suit" probably begin at about $20,000, and
he mentioned that Rosenbloom reportedly cost nearly $100,000 to defend.
Anderson, Press Self-Censorship, supra note 2, at 435-38. While some
suits certainly result in high defense costs, Anderson's analysis ignores
those never brought in the first place, those dropped before trial, and
those terminated by either a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.
In this group of cases the New York Times rule has functioned effec-
tively.
To buttress his argument that the New York Times standard is inef-
fective, Professor Anderson cited American Digest figures demonstrating
the increase in libel cases at the appellate level-117 reported decisions
in 1973 compared with 87 in 1963. Id. at 430 n.43. This comparison,
however, does not indicate the number of cases involving media defend-
ants. Moreover, even if the proportion of media defendants had in-
[Vol. 61:645
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utation and privacy interests and freedom of expression was
more difficult than the familiar task of reaching some accom-
modation between conservative and progressive social policies, 5
creased in the ten-year period, a comparatively large number of appel-
late cases in 1973 might have reflected attempts by appellate courts to
specify the perimeters of Rosenbloom. Professor Anderson also supplied
estimates by the general counsel of the American Newspaper Publishers
Association that 1100 libel suits were filed against newspapers alone in
the period from 1963 to 1974. Id. Even assuming the accuracy of this
statistic, it ignores the changes in the New York Times standard during
this period, see text accompanying notes 10-20 supra, which created un-
certainty among litigants, attorneys, and judges about the exact impact
of these decisions on libel actions. More important, however, this statis-
tic is misleading since it ignores the suits voluntarily dropped or dis-
missed prior to trial or disposed of by summary judgment. The knowing
or reckless falsity standard encourages dismissals or summary judg-
ments.
Even if the plaintiff survives the initial stages of a lawsuit, he will
still have difficulty establishing that a defamatory statement was pub-
lished with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See
e.g., Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d 122, 124 (5th
Cir. 1972); La Bruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 988 (W.D.
Mo. 1973); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 397, 402,
102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 130, 134 (1972); Twohig v. Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., 362 Mass. 887, 889, 291 N.E.2d 398, 400-01 (1973); Schwartz v.
Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 769, 773, 337 N.Y.S.2d 125, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1972);
Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 371, 192 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 (1972); Chase
v. Daily Record, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 1, 2-3, 503 P.2d 1103, 1106 (1972),
rev'd, 83 Wash. 2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973). In fact, plaintiffs have
only been able to demonstrate actual malice under the Supreme Court's
definition in a few notable cases. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414
F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) ($1.00
actual damages, $75,000 punitive damages); Field Research Corp. v. Pat-
rick, 30 Cal. App. 3d 603, 106 Cal. Rptr. 473, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
922 (1973) ($150,000 actual damages, $150,000 punitive damages);
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970) (total damages of $60,000). See also Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156-62 (1967), in which a plurality
of the Court affirmed a judgment of $460,000 for plaintiff Butts. Al-
though this affirmance was largely based on a gross negligence standard,
the conduct of the defendant would probably have satisfied the more
rigorous New York Times test. Id. at 162-70 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Finally, even assuming the actual malice standard does result in self-
censorship, the only alternative is an absolute privilege. Despite the
philosophical appeal of absolute immunity, it would leave persons in-jured by malicious and intentional conduct uncompensated, and could
encourage, or at least fail to discourage, grossly irresponsible journalism.
35. See, for example, the Supreme Court decisions on obscenity,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); those con-
cerning capital punishment, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
and the recent school busing decisions, Austin Ind. School Dist. v.
1977]
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for libertarian values underlie both of these conflicting con-
cerns. Because these values are philosophically similar, but
constitutionally incompatible, the limitations on defamation
actions imposed by the New Yorrk Times line of cases represent
a recognition of the pervasive impact and overriding impor-
tance of freedom of expression compared to the limited inter-
ests protected by defamation law.
Freedom of speech and press protect the transfer of infor-
mation to and from every member of our society and shape
society itself.8 6 Without the free exchange of ideas and infor-
mation, neither participatory democracy nor our culture could
survive.37 Protection of personal reputation and privacy, on
the other hand, although a laudable libertarian goal, operates
on a relatively isolated individual basis; very few persons are
ever harmed by inadvertent factual misstatements. Moreover,
injuries caused by false factual statements are often intangible.
Defamation arose historically as a dignitary tort to protect the
interest in reputation and social esteem. Consequently, once
a plaintiff had demonstrated false derogatory statements, the
courts simply presumed harm to reputation without proof of
actual injury.8  The Supreme Court has recently indicated
in Paul v. Davis3 9 the narrow significance of the interest in
reputation by holding that such an interest is not constitutionally
protected by the liberty or property guarantees of the due
United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229(1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
36. See text accompanying notes 45-49 infra.
37. Freedom of expression includes both the right to speak and the
right to hear. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976), and cases cited
therein; T. EMERsoN, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN 6-7 (1970).
The first amendment, according to Professor Meitdejohn, unqualifiedly
protects speech, press, assembly, or petition whenever those activities are
used by the people for the governing of the nation, A. MEnKEJOHN, Po-
LITICAL FREEDOM, 24-28, 57 (1960); Meiklejotn, The First Amendment
Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 254-56. The forms of thought
and expression he places within the first amendment's absolute protec-
tion include not only public discussion of public issues, but the dissemi-
nation of information and opinion on those issues, and information about
education, philosophy, art, and science, as well. Meiklejohn, supra at
257. The individual right to "talk" however, is a "liberty of speech" pro-
tected not by the first amendment but the fifth. MTEnLJoHN, supra at
36-37. See also Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Su-
preme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RuTGERs L. REv. 41, 42-44
(1974).
38. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 9, § 5.9, at 372; PossER, supra note
9, § 112, at 762.
39. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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process clause.40 On balance, then, the libertarian value of
protecting individual reputations, especially in absence of tangi-
ble pecuniary harm, should give way to the more important
policy of ensuring free expression. As the Kansas supreme
court noted in 1908, in the first decision to recognize the threat
of libel law to freedom of speech and press: "[0]ccasional in-
jury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The pub-
lic benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury
to private character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged."4'
This recognition of the overriding importance of freedom
of expression is reflected in a number of lower court cases
foreshadowing Rosenbloom. 42 Although prior to that decision
the "actual malice" standard was constitutionally required only
in libel actions involving plaintiffs who were public persons,43
40. After plaintiff had been arrested on a shoplifting charge, a pho-
tograph bearing his name was included in a flyer of "active shoplifters"
distributed to area merchants. The shoplifting charge was later dis-
missed, and respondent sued the police chiefs responsible for distributing
the flyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Court held that something
more than simple defamation by a state official must be shown to estab-
lish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the interest in reputation was
not "liberty" or "property." Justice Brennan, in dissent, noted that this
conclusion was anomalous in light of the Court's decision in Gertz:
It is strange that the Court should hold that the interest in one's
good name and reputation is not embraced within the concept
of "liberty" or "property" under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and yet hold that that same interest, when recognized under
state law, is sufficient to overcome the specific protections of the
First Amendment.
Id. at 1171 n.11. See text accompanying notes 201-02 infra.
The holding in Paul v. Davis, however, is consistent with the position
taken by the Burger Court in other cases alleging due process violations.
With the exception of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court has
narrowed the interests that fall within the terms "liberty" and "prop-
erty" of the due process clause. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
41. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908).
42. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th
Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
Medical Laboratories v. CBS, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968); Sellers v.
Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830
(1970); Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970); Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408
(1969); Garfinkel v. Twenty-First Century Publishing Co., 30 App. Div.
2d 787, 291 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1968).
43. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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many courts focused instead on the statements on which the
action was based; if they concerned a matter of public interest,
courts applied the knowing or reckless falsity standard, often
without even considering whether the plaintiff was a public
official or public figure.44 The decisions broadly interpreted
freedom of communication to ensure that information would not
be withheld from the "marketplace of ideas" because of the threat
of court suits. Coleman v. MacLennan,45 the first decision to
extend the common law privilege of fair comment to false
factual statements, recognized the need for a broad view of
freedom of expression that would encompass "matters of public
concern [as well as] public men, and candidates for office. '48
In Rosenbloom itself, Justice Brennan, writing for the plu-
rality, struck the same note. "'Freedom of discussion, if it would
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their peri-
od.' "4 The guarantees of speech and press extended not only to
comments upon public officials, public affairs, or public person-
alities, but to all relevant information necessary to enable
a person to cope with a complex society.48  It was to protect
this interest in the free flow of information that the Rosen-
bloom plurality focused on the public nature of the issue dis-
cussed rather than the plaintiff's status:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it sud-
denly cannot become less so merely because a private individual
is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
"voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of
the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.4 9
44. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (ND. Ill.
1970); cases cited in note 42 supra.
45. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
46. Id. at 723, 98 P. at 285 (emphasis added). It was this minority
view of the privilege of "fair comment" that the Supreme Court elevated
to a constitutional doctrine in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
280-82 (1964). See note 11 supra.
47. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
48. Id. at 42. As the Supreme Court recognized in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the communication of ideas necessary to en-
able us to so cope is not limited to statements intended to inform. "The
line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of [freedom of the press]. Everyone is familiar with instances
of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine." Id. at 510.
49. 403 U.S. at 43.
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Thus, after a careful balancing process,50 the Court per-
mitted freedom of speech and press to dominate, but not eradi-
cate, the individual interest in reputation and privacy. The
New York Times line of decisions effectively protected the dis-
cussion and transmission of ideas and information, while still
allowing recovery for the knowing or reckless disregard of indi-
vidual rights. The primary advantage of this position was its
certainty: anything of public interest would be protected by the
constitutional standard, and therefore could be published with
relative impunity while individuals, whether public or private,
would be shielded from gross media irresponsibility and malice.
III. GERTZ AND FIRESTONE: A CHANGE IN
PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY
A. THE DECISIONS
In 1974 the Supreme Court, with two new members, 51
drastically altered the logical and consistent resolution of the
conflict between libel law and freedom of expression that had
prevailed during the previous ten years. In doing so, it tipped
the balance toward protection of individual reputation and pro-
duced a potential for media self-censorship.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.52 was a libel action brought by
a prominent Chicago attorney, Elmer Gertz, against Robert
Welch, Inc., the publisher of American Opinion, a monthly
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. In 1969, Ameri-
can Opinion, as part of a continuing campaign to warn the
country of an imagined conspiracy to establish a national police
50. That this position represented careful balancing, rather than
blind preference as Robertson suggests, Robertson, supra note 2, at 205-
12, is manifested by the Court's failure to grant to media defendants the
same absolute privilege that public officials then enjoyed. See Barr v.
Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1959). Preventing intimidation of public
officials, the rationale for the Barr holding, was deemed more compelling
than preventing self-censorship. But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254, 302-04 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Gertz opinion
also recognized that the New York Times line of cases reflected judicial
balancing of conflicting interests. "The need to avoid self-censorship by
the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it
were, this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers
and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from
liability for defamation." 418 U.S. at 341.
51. Justices Powell and Rehnquist were the new members of the
Court.
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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force with communist leanings, ran an article about a Chicago
police officer named Richard Nuccio who had been convicted of
second degree murder for the shooting death of a Chicago
youth.53 In the course of this article, Gertz, who was represent-
ing the dead youth's parents in a civil action against Nuccio, was
portrayed as being responsible for framing Nuccio with murder,
even though he had had only minimal connection with the
criminal proceedings. He was also falsely accused of, among
other things, having a lengthy criminal record and being a
"Leninist" and "Communist-fronter." Gertz filed a diversity
action in federal district court and won a jury verdict of $50,-
000 after the court had rejected the publisher's contention that
Gertz was a public official or public figure. The judge, how-
ever, entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the
verdict, on the ground that the New York Times privilege
protected Robert Welch, Inc., because the article concerned a
matter of public interest.54 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing
the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom and
agreeing with the district court that Gertz had failed to show
"actual malice" by clear and convincing evidence.55
The Supreme Court reversed. With both new members
of the Court joining in the five-Justice majority, the Court
retreated from the plurality position in Rosenbloom and held
that, although a matter of public interest was involved, the New
York Times malice standard was not constitutionally required
when a private individual was defamed. 56 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, reasoned that a private person, unlike
a public figure, neither had access to the media to counteract
false statements nor had assumed the risk of publicity. The
state's interest in compensating private individuals for harm
inflicted by defamation was therefore correspondingly greater.57
53. The article was entitled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The
War On Police." Id. at 325-26.
54. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). In ad-
dition to Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who voted with the majority,
Justice Blackmun reversed the position he had taken in Rosenbloom andjoined the majority, on the ground that "it is of profound importance
for the Court to come to rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly
defined majority position that eliminates the unsureness engendered by
Rosenbloom's diversity." He somewhat surprisingly stated, "[i]f my
vote were not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior
view," id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring), which is a most curious
method of constitutional adjudication.
57. Id. at 344-46.
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"[S] o long as they [did] not impose liability without fault, the
States [could] define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory false-
hood injurious to a private individual."58 This holding per-
mitted states to adopt a negligence standard for private plain-
tiffs, whether or not the defamatory statement involved a
matter of public interest. Many lower courts have accepted
that invitation.59  Gertz did place one apparent limitation on
libel actions by private plaintiffs' against media defendants:
recoveries were restricted to compensation for "actual injury"60
unless the New York Times malice standard was satisfied.61
Since the Court in Gertz distinguished between public and
private persons, it had to define "public figure" for constitu-
tional purposes.6 2 A person could either "achieve such perva-
sive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure . . . in
all contexts" or he could "voluntarily [inject] himself or
[be] drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
[become] a public figure for a limited range of issues."6 3 The
Court found that Elmer Gertz satisfied neither of these criteria.64
The meaning of "public figure" was further elaborated in
Time, Inc. v. Firestone,65 the Supreme Court's most recent
58. Id. at 347.
59. See e.g., Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522,
543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292
(1975); Govin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975);
Jacron Sales Co v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone
v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Thomas
H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d
494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Exner v. American Med-
ical Ass'n, 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974). See also Chapa-
deau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 570(1975), in which the New York court of appeals apparently adopted
a gross negligence standard.
60. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
61. Id. For an analysis of this limitation, see text accompanying
notes 119-32 infra.
62. The "public official" category was untouched by the decision
and remains relatively uncontroversial.
63. 418 U.S. at 351. See text accompanying notes 161-69 infra.
64. The Court found that there was no "clear evidence of general
fame or notoriety in the community," apparently because none of the
prospective jurors called at the trial had ever heard of Gertz. 418 U.S.
at 352. Nor had he, through his involvement in the civil action against
Nuccio, "thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue (or] en-
gage[d] the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome."
Id.
65. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
1977]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
attempt to resolve the conflict between personal reputation and
freedom of expression. Mary Alice Firestone, the former wife
of Russell Firestone, of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,
had sued Time, Inc., alleging that its report that Mr. Firestone
had been granted a divorce on the grounds of "extreme cruelty
and adultery" was false and defamatory. 6 After Mrs. Firestone
was awarded a judgment of $100,000 in the Florida courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Time's constitutional
claim. Time argued that since the Florida supreme court had
characterized the Firestone divorce "as a 'cause celebre,' it must
have been a public controversy and respondent must be consid-
ered a public figure."67  Thus, Time claimed, Firestone could
recover only by establishing "actual malice. '68 The Court, how-
ever, in a 5-3 decision,69 found that Mary Firestone did not
satisfy the definition of "public figure," since a divorce pro-
ceeding was not the sort of "public controversy" contemplated
by Gertz, and in any event, Mrs. Firestone had not "voluntarily"
thrust herself into the public limelight.70  In emphasizing voli-
tion, the Court apparently intended to eschew the language in
Gertz that public figure status could be involuntary.71
Time also claimed that all press reports of judicial proceed-
ings should be judged by the New York Times standard because
information about the nation's courts was so important to all
citizens that it merited special protection.72  The Court rejected
this argument, suggesting that it would amount to nothing more
than a return to the Rosenbloom standard,73 that Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn74 already protected accurate reports of
information in official court records open to public inspection,
and that further protection for false reports would improperly
66. Id. at 450-52.
67. Id. at 454.
68. Id. at 452-53.
69. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
70. 424 U.S. at 453-55.
71. "More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or
is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a pub-
lic figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (emphasis added).
72. 424 U.S. at 455.
73. Id. at 456. Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, never
clearly recognized that petitioner Time was merely asking the Court to
carve out a small segment of the Rosenbloom subject matter standard-
reports of judicial proceedings-for special first amendment protection.
74. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See text accompanying notes 203-05 infra.
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balance the competing interests.75 The majority found com-
pensable injury under its Gertz formulation, but remanded Fire-
stone for a determination of negligence.76
B. POLICY FORMULATION: PURPORTED REALIGNMENT OF THE
INTERMSTS BY STRIKING A NEw BALANCE
The Supreme Court justified its decision in Gertz by em-
phasizing the need to protect private persons' reputations, but
in reformulating the balance between that interest and the first
amendment, it also professed to give the media additional pro-
tection. All prospective plaintiffs would have to show fault
and, in the absence of demonstrated malice, proof of actual dam-
ages. Careful analysis of this new balance, however, leads to
the conclusions that the preferential treatment given private
persons is unjustifiable and that the additional protection for
the media is illusory. Both these conclusions strengthen the
inference that limitation of media freedom may well have been
the Court's primary objective.
1. Preferential Treatment for Private Persons
The Court in Gertz refused to apply the New York Times
standard to private persons because "the state interest in com-
pensating injury to the reputations of private individuals requires
that a different rule should obtain with respect to them. '77 This
suggests that private plaintiffs are permitted to recover merely
by demonstrating media negligence because society has a strong-
er interest in protecting their reputations than in safeguarding
public figures' good names. Viewed in the light of first
amendment values, this distinction makes little sense. The New
York Times standard protected media statements about public
persons not because their reputations deserved less protection,78
75. 424 U.S. at 456.
76. Id. at 462-64.
77. 418 U.S. at 343. The "different rule" of which the Court spoke
was a license to the states to apply a less rigorous standard than New
York Times as long as they did not impose strict liability. Id. at 347.
78. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publi-
cations, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
913 (1976), a decision that rejected the Gertz invitation to employ a
lesser privilege in the case of private individuals and retained instead
the New York Times-Rosenbloom standard. See also Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971) (plurality opinion). "The New
York Times standard was applied to libel of a public official or figure
to give effect to the [First] Amendment's function to encourage ventila-
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but because the public had an interest in their actions. That the
individual participating in a public event is a "private" person
does not diminish either the public's interest in being informed
or the media's interest in reporting. The Court in Gertz never-
theless attempted to justify its preferential treatment of this
group on two grounds: private persons, because they did not
have access to channels of communication to counteract false
statements, were more vulnerable to injury than public figures,
and because they had not assumed the risk of publicity, were
more "deserving" of protection.79 Both justifications, however,
suffer from serious logical flaws.
The argument that public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of communication, and hence have
a better opportunity to rebut false statements, is little more than
an empty generalization. As Justice Brennan noted in his plu-
rality opinion in Rosenbloom80 and his dissent in Gertz,81 any
discrepancy in access to channels of communication exists only
for very prominent people who command media attention; for
all other individuals, whether public or private, access to the
media depends on the unpredictable event of continuing media
interest.8 2  Furthermore, even when a report generates wide-
spread interest, media sources may be reluctant to denounce
each others' stories, since this would invite competitors to
retaliate and could create a "news reliability" war.83  Similar-
ly, because publishers hesitate to print statements that contradict
their own charges, access to the original source of an allegedly
defamatory story may be equally unavailable.8 4  Finally, even
tion of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest
in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life."
79. 418 U.S. at 344-45.
80. 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
81. 418 U.S. at 363.
82. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 363 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46
(1971).
83. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1420-21. Eaton notes that while a
public figure involved in a story of widespread interest may have access
to competing channels of communication to rebut the defamation, if the
interest in the story is only local, access is unlikely. Local media sources
shy away from disseminating denunciations of their competitors' stories.
84. Id. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), dramatically illustrates the reluctance of the media to publish
rebuttals contradicting their own statements. In Tornillo the newspaper
refused to print the reply by a political candidate to charges made in
political editorials even though a statute required it to do so. The Su-
preme Court upheld the newspaper's refusal, striking down the statute




if a rebuttal were widely disseminated, it would tend to be
discounted as self-serving.8 5 The Gertz majority recognized
this weakness of the self-help rationale:
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to un-
do harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with
a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, stand-
ing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is
irrelevant to our inquiry.8 6
Thus, because self-help is so uncertain and deficient a remedy, it
is "too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional
distinction."87
The Gertz majority relied more heavily on the theory that
private citizens, unlike public figures, did not assume the risk of
public scrutiny and therefore deserved more protection from
defamation. The validity of this theory turns, in part, on the
Court's definition of "public figure" as a person of general fame
or notoriety, or a person who voluntarily injects himself into a
public controversy.88 Although the latter can perhaps be said
to have assumed a risk of increased media attention, the risk
differs, if at all, only in the slightest degree from that which
all citizens assume in our complex and interactive society.89 The
chances of drawing public attention are always high: every
citizen "assumes the risk of media comment when he becomes
involved, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in a matter of
general or public interest."90 It is difficult to perceive why one
who enters the public arena voluntarily should forfeit the pro-
tection of libel laws that "private persons" enjoy.
The Court may have intended to suggest that a public
figure's assumed risk differs qualitatively from that which all
citizens assume, for it drew its argument partly by analogy to
the position of public officials.9 1 Because public officials' per-
85. Eaton, supra note 2, at 1420.
86. 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
87. Id. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 345; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 421 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
89. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. "Exposure of the self
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized com-
munity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a
society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 364 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47-48 (1971).
90. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publi-
cations, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (Ind. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
913 (1976).




sonal attributes are germane to their fitness for public duty,92
they put their "characters in issue" by entering the public arena
and can expect that even the private details of their lives will be
discussed. They may therefore be said to assume a risk not only
of media exposure but of defamation as well. Extending this
rationale, however, to the general category of public figures is
particularly inapt. A person of pervasive fame or notoriety,
such as a talented musician or professional athlete, no more
invites public attention to his private life than does a private
individual involved in a public event. Neither expects that his
private life, which is irrelevant to the reasons he is in the public
arena, will be publicly discussed. Thus, even if the Court
intended to distinguish qualitatively between the type of risk
public and private persons assume, that distinction does not
logically support the assumption of risk argument.
Finally, the assumption of risk doctrine, as a matter of
general tort law, is in effect a method of defining whether the
defendant has a duty toward the plaintiff.9 3 As evidenced
by the growing judicial disfavor with the doctrine,94 it is
illogical to condition the defendant's duty of care on whether the
plaintiff voluntarily or involuntarily encountered the risk of
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must ac-
cept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in pub-
lic affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might
otherwise be the case. And society's interest in the officers of
government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of offi-
cial duties. ... [T]he public's interest extends to "anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office.... Few
personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than
dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though
these characteristics may also affect the official's private char-
acter." Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion.
418 U.S. at 344-45 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
92. See note 91 supra.
93. See James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78
YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
94. Assumption of risk is being replaced with contributory or com-
parative negligence. The jurisdictions abolishing assumption of risk
as a separate defense have done so in the belief that the doctrine is
confusing and that courts can reach the same result under a negligence
and contributory negligence analysis. See, e.g., Parker v. Redden, 421
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1967); Felgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d
136 (1965); McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196
A.2d 238 (1963). Assumption of risk has also been eliminated as
a defense under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 54
(1970), and most jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence rules
have replaced assumption of risk with a comparative fault approach.
See, e.g., Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226,
1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn.
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harm. It is the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct that is,
or should be, central to the inquiry. Since voluntarily exposing
oneself to media attention cannot generally be characterized as
"unreasonable," it is inequitable to restrict recovery for this class
of plaintiffs while facilitating it for those whose exposure was
"involuntary."95
The Court's stated justifications for granting preferential
treatment to private persons therefore lack force. Indeed, the
Court appears to have relied almost entirely on what may only be
characterized as legal fictions in order to reach a desired result.
The insubstantiality of the Court's reasoning supports the
conclusion that protection of individual reputation may have
been less important to the decisions than was curtailment of
media activities.
2. Additional Protection for the Media
In Gertz, the Court disclaimed divorcing itself philosoph-
ically from the Rosenbloom view96 that the first amendment
must protect discussion of matters of public interest as well
as public persons.9 7 While recognizing the importance of
the first amendment policies,98 it purported merely to better
23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971); McConville v. State Farm Auto. Ins.
Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
572h (West 1975).
95. The access to the media and assumption of the risk distinctions
are also inapposite when a local public figure is defamed by a national
publication. A person who has gained some notoriety in his own com-
munity or thrust himself to the forefront of a local controversy has
not assumed the risk of national exposure, nor does he usually have
access to national publications. Nevertheless, the Court appears to
consider the local community the relevant focal point for making the
public figure determination. In Gertz, the majority noted that "[a]l-
though petitioner was ... well known in some circles, he had achieved
no general fame or notoriety in the community." 418 US. at 351-52 (em-
phasis added).
96. Justice Harlan, who never wanted to extend the New York
Times privilege beyond public officials, recognized in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1966), that the "Founders . . . felt that
a free press would advance 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general'
as well as responsible government." And the plurality opinion in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971), accepted the premise
that "[f]reedom of discussion ... must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period."
97. If the majority had returned to the pre-Rosenbloom position,
the states could have imposed common law strict liability when private
individuals sued the media.
98. This conclusion is not based on a belief that the considera-
tions which prompted the adoption of the New York Times priv-
ilege for defamation of public officials and its extension to public
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accommodate the competing interests by extending more protec-
tion to private persons. The court buttressed this disclaimer by
offering the media a quid pro quo: in exchange for eliminating
the constitutional requirement that private plaintiffs demonstrate
actual malice to recover, all plaintiffs would be required to show
fault99 and, absent proof of malice, only recovery for "actual
injury"' 100 would be permitted. Careful analysis is required to
gauge the effect of these protections and to assess the Court's
underlying policy objective.
The holding in Gertz that the states may define for them-
selves the standard of liability when a private plaintiff alleges
defamation, 10 so long as they do not impose strict liability,
applies to all private persons, whether or not they are caught up
in matters of public interest.10 2 That the Court intended to
protect publishers and broadcasters from liability without a
showing of fault is clear from Justice Powell's majority opinion:
The 'public or general interest' test for determining the
applicability of the New York Times standard to private defama-
tion actions inadequately serves both of the competing values
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose reputa-
tion is injured by defamatory falsehood that does concern an
issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can
meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times .... On
the other hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or general
interest may be held liable in damages even if it took every
reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions.03
Since private persons not involved in matters of public interest
formerly could have recovered without any showing of fault, 04
the Court's standard theoretically gave the media "new" protec-
tion.
This additional protection is, however, almost entirely theo-
retical. First, even though the common law permitted plaintiffs
to recover without showing any form of fault, 0 5 large recov-
figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of private indi-
viduals. Rather, we endorse this approach in recognition of the
strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private in-
dividuals for injury to reputation.
418 U.S. at 348-49.
99. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
100. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
101. Id. at 347-49.
102. Id. at 347. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
103. Id. at 346 (emphasis added). See also id. at 390-92 (White, J.,
dissenting).
104. See generally PRossER, supra note 9, § 113, at 771-74; REsTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 479-80 (1938).
105. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 9, § 5.5, at 364; PRoSSER, supra
note 9, § 113, at 771-74; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §§ 579-80 (1938).
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eries based on strict liability alone were probably rare.106  The
Gertz fault requirement is therefore of little pragmatic signif-
icance to media defendants. 10 7 Second, and more important, in
light of the development of the law under the New York Times
standard, 0 8 the proscription of strict liability for private plain-
tiffs not involved in matters of public interest touches so few
cases as to be virtually irrelevant. Publishers rarely, if ever,
have been involved in libel actions in which the plaintiff was
a private individual and the defamatory statements concerned
purely private matters. Members of the media have no incen-
tive, economic or otherwise, to report on such events, for their
function is to disseminate information of interest to the public.
Given that function and perspective, combined with the ex-
pertise publishers and broadcasters develop in assessing public
interest, it is reasonable to presume that everything published
or broadcast, including coverage of private persons, involves
only matters of general public interest. 0 9
Examination of the case law bears this out. Nearly all
the reported attempts to show that allegedly defamatory state-
ments were not of public interest have been unsuccessful." 0
Everything from information about racial and religious issues:"'
106. See Anderson, Press Self-Censorship, supra note 2, at 443. Pro-
fessor Anderson points out that the Restatement of Torts recognized
thirteen common law privileges. Id. at 443 n.97. The practical effect
of these privileges was to require the plaintiff to prove "something akin
to fault." Id. at 443.
107. The only suits the Gertz requirement would preclude are cases
of purely inadvertent error; such cases were rare even at common law.
Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REV. 36
(1937).
108. See notes 110-18 infra and accompanying text.
109. This is essentially the view of Justice Douglas. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But
see Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts,
and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267, 284. See also Cohen, A New Niche
for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in
Libel Cases, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 371, 380 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1972); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979 (W.D.
Mo. 1973); Roketenetz v. Woburn Daily Times, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 579
(Mass. App. 1973); cases cited in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 377 n.10 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
111. See Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454
F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (church tax exemption); Washington v. New
York News, Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 557, 322 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1971) (bishop's
attendance of night club performance); DeVore v. Time, Inc., 73 Misc.




to hotel and restaurant accommodations" 12 have been classed as
public concerns. Only four recent cases have clearly con-
cluded that the publication or broadcast in question was not
a matter of public interest:1 3 of these four, one was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court," 4 and three are questiona-
112. See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.
1970); Twenty-five E. 40th St. Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d
595, 282 N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972); Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc.
v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
113. Steam v. MacLean-Hunter, Ltd., 46 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972); Matus v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
930 (1972); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192
S.E.2d 737 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). Border-
line cases include Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 937 (1974); Buckley v. Esquire, Inc.,
344 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Francis v. Lake Charles Am. Press,
262 La. 875, 265 So.2d 206 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 901 (1973).
In Taggart, the court reversed a summary judgment for the defendants
and remanded for a factual determination of whether plaintiff had been
"drawn out as a performer" rather than merely photographed as a par-
ticipant in a newsworthy event (in this case, the Woodstock rock fes-
tival). The court intimated that section 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law would apply to the former, whereas the first amendment would pro-
tect the latter. In Buckley, the district court merely denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment and suggested that there was a question
of material fact as to whether the article in defendant's magazine dealt
with a public figure's public or private life, since the New York Times
privilege applied only to the former. Francis held simply that the Rosen-
bloom privilege did not apply to a plaintiff mistakenly identified by de-
fendant as involved in a matter of public interest.
When media defendants are not involved, the courts have developed
one clear category of cases in which they find no public interest-credit
reporting. Eaton, supra note 2, at 1402 n.223. See, e.g., Hood v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985
(1974); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972);
Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1972); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971); Baird
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166 (1971).
114. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d
737 (1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). Because the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that a reference to plaintiff-appellees as "scabs" in a
union newsletter was not a matter of public interest, it refused to apply
the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity, using in-
stead the common law concept of actual malice (a corrupt motive, hatred,
personal spite or ill will.). The court believed this satisfied the re-
quirements for labor disputes delineated by Linn v. Plant Guard Work-
ers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). 213 Va. at 383-84, 192 S.E.2d at 742-43. The Su-
preme Court reversed: Virginia should have applied the New York
Times standard because the federal labor law policy is to encourage
union freedom of speech. 418 U.S. at 280-82. Although this decision did




ble.115 In Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc.," 6 for example,
the Pennsylvania supreme court found no public interest in a
comment by the host of a radio talk show that plaintiff had
charged an exorbitant fee for plowing the broadcaster's drive-
way. This holding can be questioned because the plaintiff
was regularly engaged in the snowplowing business and
the comments caused considerable listener interest.' Thus,
contrary to Justice Powell's statement in Gertz, judges seldom
have trouble deciding "on an ad hoc basis which publications
address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do
not.' 118 In short, the problem the Court purported to solve by
requiring the fault standard is virtually nonexistent.
The other professed first amendment protection Gertz pro-
vided the media was limiting recoveries to "actual injury,"
presumed and punitive damages"19 being allowed only if the
plaintiff satisfied the New York Times standard. 20  The Court
purported to change the common law "presumed damages rule,"
whereby under some circumstances defamation was actionable
without proof of harm.' 21 The practical effect of this limitation,
however, given the majority's concept of "actual injury," is
minimal.
115. Steam v. MacLean-Hunter, Ltd., 46 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(critic commenting on personal motives of author); Firestone v. Time,
Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972); Matus v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 445
Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971).
116. 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971).
117. Id. at 387-88, 286 A.2d at 359.
118. 418 U.S. at 346.
119. The primary cause of self-censorship may well be the prolifera-
tion of libel actions and the unwillingness to undergo the expense of libel
litigation. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53
(1971); Anderson, Press Self-Censorship, supra note 2, at 430-38. Both
the cost of defending a libel action and the threat of substantial compen-
satory damages may exacerbate self-censorship as much as a threat of
punitive damages.
Moreover, the purported Gertz change in punitive damages recovery
was not a change in the status quo. Prior to Gertz, virtually all plain-
tiffs had to establish knowing or reckless falsity in order to recover.
See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text. Upon making that show-
ing punitive damages would be recoverable. After Gertz punitive dam-
ages are available upon the same showing.
120. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
121. At common law, certain defamatory material was considered ac-
tionable per se; proof of the defamation itself established the existence
of damages and the jury was permitted to estimate an amount without
any evidence of injury being presented. PRoss.R, supra note 9, § 112, at
754. Some states drew a distinction between libel that was actionable
per se and slander, confining per se slander to cases in which the defend-
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The Court expressly disclaimed defining "actual injury."'12
It nevertheless stated that actual injury was not confined to out-
of-pocket loss,1 23 and could include "the more customary types
of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood such as
impairment of reputation and standing in the community, per-
sonal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.' 1 24  Al-
though the opinion further suggested that such injuries must be
proved by "competent evidence," the Court noted that "there
need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value" to
them. 2 5 In short, the actual injury requirement presents but a
small bar to plaintiffs; they need not show tangible harm and
"competent evidence" could amount to nothing more than the
testimony of friends or colleagues that they thought less of the
plaintiff after hearing the defendant's statements. The jury is
just as free to guess at the dollar amount to assign to an intan-
gible injury as under the common law per se rule. By refusing
to require the translation of negative community reaction into
actual tangible harm, the Court left the presumed damages rule
essentially intact. Had the Court been concerned with both
protecting reputational interests and insulating the media from
arbitrary awards, a better course would have been to limit
plaintiff's recoveries to compensation for pecuniary harm, as
required under the common law special damages rule. 26  A
plaintiff who has suffered tangible harm provides a more com-
pelling reason to restrict first amendment interests than does
one whose harm is intangible and, perhaps, even hypothetical.
Not content to retain the presumed damages concept in
euphemistic form, the Gertz majority noted that recoverable
injury could include humiliation and mental distress. This
statement was an open invitation to the states to change the very
ant had accused the plaintiff of a crime, of having a loathsome disease, or
of having made statements that affected the plaintiff's trade or business.
Id. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 371-76 (White,
J., dissenting). In the absence of per se defamation, the plaintiff had
to prove special damages. See note 126 infra.
122. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
123. Id. at 350.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. At common law, plaintiffs were required to show special dam-
ages in order to sue where the defendant's statements were not action-
able per se. Normally, special damages must be pecuniary, such as the
loss of customers or business, of a particular contract, of employment,
or of a financially advantageous marriage. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 9, § 5.14, at 388-89; PnossER, supra note 9, § 112, at 760-61.
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definition of the tort of defamation.' 27 At common law, the
tort was designed to remedy injury to a relational interest-
lowered esteem in the eyes of the community-rather than to
provide recovery for mental distress or humiliation.128 The
Gertz standard, by permitting such recoveries whether or not
harm to reputation is proved, 129 actually increases, rather than
limits, both the likelihood and potential magnitude of compensa-
tory awards.
That Gertz encouraged states to redefine defamation is
evident from the Firestone decision. The plaintiff had with-
drawn her claim for damage to reputation before trial and
sought recovery only for mental anguish. The defendant argued
on appeal that in the absence of harm to reputation there was no
cause of action for libel. Although the Florida district court
agreed,130 the Florida supreme court reinstated the $100,000
verdict on the ground that plaintiff had offered competent evi-
127. As the Supreme Court noted in another context, "damage to
reputation is, of course, the essence of libel." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971). This point was stressed by Justice White in
his dissent in Gertz:
At the heart of the libel-and-slander-per-se damage scheme lay
the award of general damages for loss of reputation. They were
granted without special proof because the judgment of history
was that the content of the publication itself was so likely to
cause injury and because "in many cases the effect of defamatory
statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly
to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed."
418 U.S. at 372-73 (citations omitted). See also Eaton, supra note 2, at
1437.
128. See F. POLLOcK, Tns LAw or TORTS 181 (15th ed. 1951); PRossEa,
supra note 9, § 111, at 737. Although the publication of a per se libel
raised the presumption of damage to reputation under the common law,
the rule developed not to provide recovery for the insult or for any re-
sulting mental distress but to compensate for reputational injury and to
serve a vindictatory function. If the defendant demonstrated that the
plaintiffs reputation had not been injured, usually by introducing evi-
dence of his previous bad reputation, the plaintiff could not recover com-
pensatory damages but could still receive a nominal award. 1 HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 9, § 5.30, at 468. See also Eaton, supra note 2, at 1437-
38; Eldredge, Practical Problems in Preparation and Trial of Libel Cases,
15 VA D. L. REV. 1085 (1962).
Once either defamation per se or special damages were shown, the
common law did permit recovery for "general" damages, including men-
tal distress or pain and suffering. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 112, at 761.
But these damages were "parasitic" to the cause of action, not, as Fire-
stone allows, elements of it.
129. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1437-39. "Negligent infliction of
mental distress by publishing a falsehood may well be a tort, but it is
not the tort of defamation." Id. at 1438.




dence of actual injury under Gertz.131 The United States Su-
preme Court upheld this determination:
Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for other in-juries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood
may have had upon a plaintiffs reputation. This does not
transform the action into something other than an action for
defamation as that term is meant in Gertz. In that opinion we
made it clear that States could base awards on elements other
than injury to reputation, specifically listing 'personal humilia-
tion, and mental anguish and suffering' as examples of injuries
which might be compensated consistently with the Constitution
upon a showing of fault. Because respondent has decided to
forgo recovery for injury to her reputation, she is not prevented
from obtaining compensation for such other damages that a
defamatory falsehood may have caused her.132
Media defendants thus gained little from Gertz and Fire-
stone. The supposed elimination of the presumed damages rule
is without practical effect, since recovery for harm to reputation
is still available without proof of financial loss. Moreover, plain-
tiffs may now recover for noneconomic harm such as mental
distress. The "result is clearly to invite gratuitous awards of
money damages far in excess of any actual injury and jury
punishment of unpopular opinion rather than compensation to
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false
fact.'13 3 This outcome, coupled with the logical insubstantiality
of the private/public person distinction, makes it necessary to
reject the Court's explanation that it was simply realigning com-
peting individual and first amendment interests and to focus
instead on the immediate effect of the decisions-restriction of
media power and influence.
C. MEDIA CONTROL
An initial perusal of Gertz and Firestone leaves the impres-
sion that the decisions will significantly limit media freedom by
encouraging self-censorship. That effect, combined with the
weakness of the Court's rationale, indicates that the policy under-
lying these cases is to restrict media freedom and concomitantly
reduce the influence of the press in American society. The
extent to which Gertz and Firestone represent an actual shift in
the Court's attitude toward the media and an attempt to limit
131. 305 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 424
U.S. 448 (1976).
132. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
133. Id. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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coverage to matters at the core of self-government or to ab-
solutely verifiable information, can be more precisely gauged by
examining in detail several factors in the decisions-the likely
impact of the private person negligence standard, the definition
of "public figure," and the refusal to grant a special privilege to
reports of judicial proceedings.
1. Negligence Standard for Private Persons
The primary mechanism for ensuring press self-censorship
is the Court's grant of permission to the states to impose negli-
gence liability on media defendants in actions brought by private
plaintiffs. Because it is impossible to predict what a jury will
label "reasonable care," media reports on matters involving
private persons will demand extreme caution.134 In evaluating
the defendant's conduct, a jury made up of private citizens
may be influenced by sympathy toward the plaintiff rather
than by concern for the relatively abstract matter of first amend-
ment freedoms. Media liability may thus effectively turn on
falsity alone, with little weight given to the defendant's efforts to
verify a story before publication.
This scenario describes perfectly what happened in Fire-
stone. Time's erroneous report that Russell Firestone had been
granted a divorce from his wife on grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultery was an honest and entirely reasonable misinterpre-
tation of a cryptic judicial decision. The circuit court judge,
while noting that the parties had indulged in sexual escapades
and granting Mr. Firestone's counterclaim which alleged extreme
cruelty and adultery, also awarded Mrs. Firestone alimony.
Florida law did not permit an alimony award when the divorce
was based on adultery; 135 thus, the decree could not have been
granted on that ground and Time was legally in error. The
mistake was hardly unreasonable, however, given the ambiguity
134. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gertz, noted:
The reasonable-care standard is "elusive," . . . ; it saddles
the press with "the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury
might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the
accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait."...
Under a reasonable-care regime, publishers and broadcasters will
have to make pre-publication judgments about juror assessment
of such diverse considerations as the size, operating procedures,
and financial condition of the newsgathering system, as well as
the relative costs and benefits of instituting less frequent and
more costly reporting at a higher level of accuracy.
418 U.S. at 366 (citations omitted).
135. See Justice Rehnquist's account of the facts in his opinion for
the Court in Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450-51.
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of the decree and Time's unfamiliarity with the technicalities of
Florida law. Furthermore, Time checked and double-checked
the story and even called the plaintiff's attorney and the judge
for verification.1 36 The Florida appeals court, the first court to
review Mrs. Firestone's libel judgment, found that Time had
done everything possible to check the story's accuracy,' 3 7 but
the Florida supreme court reversed, stating:
[T]his erroneous reporting is clear and convincing evidence of
the negligence in certain segments of the news media in gather-
ing the news .... A careful examination of the final decree
prior to publication would have clearly demonstrated that the
divorce had been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty,
and thus the wife would have been saved the humiliation of
being accused of adultery in a nation-wide magazine. This is
a flagrant example of "journalistic negligence."' 38
The United States Supreme Court held this bare statement insuf-
ficient to support the conclusion that the courts below had
actually found negligence, 139 so it remanded to the Florida
courts for that determination'.
40
That the Court remanded the issue demonstrates one major
impact of the 'Court's adoption of a negligence standard. In
previous libel cases the Court had reviewed the facts in order to
protect media defendants from unrealistic findings of liability
that contravened prevailing constitutional standards.' 4 1  The
136. There were checks and double checks, quite extensive in
scope considering the obvious press of time forced by journalistic
deadlines. Nowhere was there proof Time was even negligent,
much less intentionally false or in reckless disregard of the
truth.
in addition to Time's rational interpretation of the plead-
ings, testimony and decree, it investigated independently at
length. It contacted its Miami bureau and its Palm Beach
stringer several times by wire and phone to substantiate infor-
mation. Plaintiff's attorney and the judge were called for ver-
ification.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971),
rev'd, 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972), modified, 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448
(1976).
137. Id.
138. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), vacated,
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
139. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 462-63 (1976).
140. Id. at 463-64. The Court stated: "It may well be that peti-
tioner's account in its 'Milestones' section was the product of some fault
on its part, and that the libel judgment against it was, therefore, entirely
consistent with Gertz."
141. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-88 (1964),
the Court examined the evidence and concluded that the New York
Times was not guilty of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
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remand, especially in light of Time's lack of negligence,142 im-
plies that appellate review of jury findings of negligence will be
extremely circumspect and will not afford media defendants
even "last-ditch" protection from arbitrariness.
The uncertainty engendered by a negligence standard and
the imposition of something approaching strict liability in cases
like Firestone encourage media self-censorship. To ensure rela-
tive security from libel actions, material disseminated will have
to be limited to reports involving public persons, and thus
protected by the New York Times standard, or statements about
private persons that can be verified with absolute accuracy.
While this arguably guarantees more responsible reporting, it
exacts too high a price. Much information important to the
public simply cannot be absolutely verified and hence will tend
to be "voluntarily" suppressed; as Justice Douglas noted in his
dissent in Gertz, "it may well be the reasonable man who
refrains from speaking."'143
Defamation cases brought by private plaintiffs illustrate the
type of information that may fail to reach the public in the future
because, although reliable and accurate, it can neither be veri-
fied before publication nor proved absolutely accurate in court.
Rosenbloom, for example, concerned the enforcement of ob-
scenity laws, Gertz an alleged communist conspiracy, and Fire-
stone the activity of the nation's courts. Other decisions have
involved subjects such as organized crime,L44 toy safety, 45 fraud
the truth, and in Associated Press v. Walker, a companion case to Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 158-59 (1967), the plurality found
the "irresponsible publisher" standard there employed unsatisfied. In
Butts, however, the evidence was "ample to support a finding of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stand-
ards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." Id. at 158. Although the trial court decision in Butts pre-
ceded New York Times, the conduct of the defendant would have satis-
fied the New York Times knowing or reckless falsity standard. Id. at
165-67 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
142. See 424 U.S. at 493 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. 418 U.S. at 360. The function of the first amendment in pro-
tecting the dissemination of material is also discussed in the Supreme
Court's obscenity decisions. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(first amendment prohibits making mere private possession of obscene
material a crime).
144. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.
1971); Time, Inc. v. Regano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970).




by computer training school,146 drug distribution,147  business
kick-backs, 148 and the flammability of baby cribs.149  Reports
on these issues are vital to preserving the free marketplace of
ideas and an informed citizenry. The very function of a free
press is to transfer ideas and information so that the public is
fully and freely informed; self-government and -participatory
democracy are thereby facilitated. 150 To the extent that Gertz
and Firestone limit media freedom, they restrict this flow of
information and consequently curtail freedom of expression.151
146. Commercial Programming Unltd. v. CBS, 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367
N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d
351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975).
147. El Meson Espafiol v. New York Magazine Corp., 389 F. Supp.
357 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
148. Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
149. ABC v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 312 N.E.2d 85 (Ind. App. 1974).
150. Speech may be thought to serve the function of self-fulfillment,
see T. EmERsoN, Tim SYSTEM or F Raom or ExraFssioN (1970). Free-
dom of the press, on the other hand, has no intrinsic value apart from
facilitating the transfer and communication of ideas and information.
Meiklejohn believes the first amendment is designed primarily to further
the socio-political interest in being informed, so that citizens may govern
themselves effectively, Meiklejohn, supra note 37, at 255, and would ex-
tend absolute protection to the receipt of ideas and information relevant
to this purpose. Id. at 256. Although a majority of the Supreme Court
has never taken the absolutist position, it adhered to this basic view of
freedom of expression in the New York Times line of cases. It also
recognized that the first amendment protects the receipt of information
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
151. Although Gertz and Firestone limit freedom of expression by
reducing the amount and kind of information that will flow to the
public, this restriction was probably not the Court's primary objective.
This conclusion can be inferred from the Court's recent decisions ex-
tending and protecting freedom of speech. See Madison Joint School
Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm., 97 S. Ct. 421
(1976) (upholding, on freedom of speech grounds, the right of a non-
union teacher to speak at meeting of the board of education in face of the
claim that such action interfered with labor-management relations and as
such was a prohibited labor practice under Wisconsin law); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (holding a Virginia statute banning the advertising of prescription
drugs to violate the first amendment, and thus extending first amendment
protection to "commercial speech"); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975) (city ordinance prohibiting exhibition of non-obscene
motion pictures by drive-in theaters, visible from "any public street or
public place," in which "the human male or female bare buttocks, human
female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown," an unconsti-
tutional restriction of freedom of expression); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating prison regulations authorizing censorship
of mail on ground that they restricted right of free speech of both pris-
oners and their correspondents; such censorship impermissible unless rea-
[Vol. 61:645
DEFAMATION
In the political arena, the deterrent effect of the negligence
standard portends even more drastic consequences. Increased
government secrecy, combined with the complex nature and
widespread effect of governmental decision making, makes
greater, rather than less, media coverage important. Moreover,
private persons, such as corporate heads or lobbyists, may either
affect or dictate many important political decisions. 152  Thus,
even if media coverage is to be restricted to matters at the core
of self-government, protection for coverage of private persons
should not be withdrawn. Perhaps in this area, more than any
other, the first amendment interest in media coverage of persons
with potential political impact, or political events with which
private persons may be connected, should outweigh the oc-
casional harm to a private individual's reputation. The difficulty
of clearly separating private from public interests, however, will
cause publishers to restrict dissemination of information with
clear political significance. A New York trial judge, in rejecting
the Gertz standard and adhering to Rosenbloom,'53 identified the
sonably limited to a substantial governmental interest and minimal pro-
cedural safeguards provided). But see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-
38 (1976) (upholding military regulations denying political candidates
access to military installations; unlike public parks and streets, military
bases, given their traditional functions, are not "public forums" for indi-
vidual expression); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no constitu-
tional right to use a privately owned shopping center as forum for first
amendment rights). Rather, the burden on freedom of expression is
merely a consequential effect of the Court's effort to restrict media power
and influence.
152. The link between private industry and government has been
well documented. See, e.g., A. BEaRL, PowER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959);
J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRiAL STATE 326-42 (1967); C.W. MIL s, THE
POWER ELITE 269-97 (1956); C. REIcH, THE GREENING OF AIuERcA 91-140
(1970). One good example of this relationship is the Vietnam War,
which was perpetuated, in part, to serve the needs of private enterprise
and the American economy. See R. BArET, THE ECONOmy OF DEATH
57-128 (1969); GALBRAM, supra; P. SLATER, THE PuRsuIT oF LONELnTEss
29-53 (1971); Zavialev, Who Formulates Policy in America Today, INTrL
Ayr., May, 1970, at 48. Another example is congressional lobbyists whose
sole task is to ensure governmental decisions that benefit their clients.
Private businesses may also influence the government through legal and
illegal political and campaign contributions as was made apparent dur-
ing the Nixon Administration.
With the contraction of New York Times protection, much material
of direct political significance may never be published or broadcast be-
cause of the involvement of a private person and the publisher's uncer-
tainty as to his ability to prove its accuracy in court. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Vallis, 356 Mass. 662, 255 N.E.2d 337 (1970) (sometime and intermittent
political candidate accused of criminal activity); Arber v. Stahlin, 382
Mich. 300, 170 N.W.2d 45 (1969) (unfair campaign practices).
153. Commercial Programming Unltd. v. CBS, 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367
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problem succinctly: "Were it not for a press unafraid to pub-
lish matters of public interest although there be risk . . . that
... a private individual might be the subject of innocent mis-
statement, the most significant saga of official corruption in
our history might never have been told. .... ,154 The reference,
of course, was to Watergate.
2. The Definition of "Public Figure"
Although the Supreme Court in the companion cases of
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker'55
had expanded the constitutional protection afforded the media
to include public figures, it never clearly defined the concept.
The Court merely noted that both plaintiffs "commanded suffi-
cient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the
means of counterargument to be able to 'expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements."'156
Later decisions by both the Supreme Court and lower courts
interpreted the concept of "public figure" fairly liberally,'157 but
the term received little refinement because, even prior to
Rosenbloom,15 8 courts tended to focus not on the plaintiff's
N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 351,
378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975).
154. Id. at 687, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
155. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
156. Id. at 155 (quoting in part from Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring)).
157. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6 (1970) (prominent local real estate developer); News-Journal Co.
v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967) (realtor and chairman of local
Republican Committee); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970) (editor of small weekly newspaper); Urchisin
v. Hauser, 221 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 231 So. 2d 6 (1970) (city prosecutor); A.S. Bell Co. v. Barnes,
238 Md. 56, 265 A.2d 207 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971) (candi-
date for delegate to state constitutional convention); Beatty v. Ellings,
285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1969) (opponent
of local urban renewal); Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409
(1967) (university professor); Lloyds v. UPI, 63 Misc.2d 421, 311 N.Y.S.
2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1970) ("foremost" trainer-driver of standard bred
horses); Trexler v. El Paso Times, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.),
rev'd on other grounds, 447 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1969) (university profes-
sor); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 427 (1970) (local fireman and policemen running
a local election); Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436
P.2d 756 (1967) (college basketball coach).
158. After Rosenbloom, the "public figure" issue became largely ir-
relevant, see text accompanying note 49 supra, because the Court found
the matter of public interest determinative for purposes of applying the
New York Times standard.
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status, but on whether the issue was of public interest, granting
New York Times protection when it was.159
Because it stressed the constitutional distinction between
private individuals and public figures, the Gertz majority had to
define "public figure" to guide lower courts in differentiating
between these two groups. The definition that emerges from
Gertz and Firestone provides an effective tool to implement
the Court's objective of restricting media coverage and influ-
ence to matters of imminent political relevance. Only reports
about public officials who enjoy governmental decision-making
authority, and other persons who either actually attempt, or are
in a position to influence governmental policies are protected by
the New York Times standard. Media defendants will often
find it difficult to show that a plaintiff falls within this narrow
class.
Although the Court discussed public figures in various
contexts in Gertz,160 when specifically deciding whether peti-
tioner Elmer Gertz fell within the category, Justice Powell de-
fined the concept as follows:
That designation [public figure] may rest on either of two
alternative bases. In some instances an individual may achieve
such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public
figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly,
an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons
assume special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions.161
In Firestone, however, the Court selected slightly different
language from the Gertz opinion to define "public figure,"
emphasizing the individual's influence on public questions.
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. 162
The Court has thus developed a dual-level test for determining
whether a plaintiff is a public figure: the "general" public
figure must have the power potentially to influence public opin-
159. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
160. 418 U.S. at 345, 351-52.
161. Id. at 351.
162. 424 U.S. at 453 (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974)) (emphasis added).
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ion, and the "special" public figure must actually attempt to
affect the resolution of a public issue.
The "general" public figure's possible influence on public
opinion appears to be measured by notoriety or prominence.
Gertz and Firestone demonstrate, however, that this condition is
difficult to meet. In the former case, the Court concluded that
Elmer Gertz had insufficient fame or notoriety to be a public
figure,163 despite the fact that he had authored four books and
many articles appearing in "historical, legal, literary ... and
other publications;"'164 had represented some rather famous
clients including Nathan Leopold and the publishers of Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer;16 5 had made television and radio
appearances locally and around the country;166 had been the
subject of over forty articles in Chicago papers; 6T and had
served as an officer of local civic groups and various professional
organizations.1 68  That this degree of notoriety did not satisfy
the Court's test renders superfluous any reference to Mary Alice
Firestone's prominence in Palm Beach society, which the Court
also found insufficient. 169 Only plaintiffs such as William F.
Buckley 70 and Johnny Carson,1 7 both of whom were designat-
163. The court of appeals questioned the trial court's assump-
tion that Gertz was not a public figure. "Plaintiff's considerable
stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, and participant in matters of public
import undermine [sic] the validity of the assumption that he is not a
'public figure' .... ." 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972). This issue was
not decided, however, because it affirmed on the Rosenbloom rationale.
The Supreme Court may have concluded that petitioner Gertz lacked
sufficient general fame and notoriety because "[n]one of the prospectivejurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner prior to this litiga-
tion, and respondent offered no proof that this response was atypical of
the local population." 418 U.S. at 352.
164. Brief for Petitioner at 152-53 app., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
165. In Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 50 WsH. L. REv. 57, 75 (1974), the authors conclude that "Gertz
was a public figure in every sense of the term as defined by the Supreme
Court in Curtis v. Butts. The Rosenbloom rule should not have been at
issue in the case." The Court, however, obviously restricted the defini-
tion of public figure in Gertz.
166. Brief for Petitioner at 153 app., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
167. Id. at 107.
168. 418 U.S. at 351.
169. 424 U.S. at 453. But see id. at 484-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
in which Justice Marshall concluded that respondent Mary Alice Firestone
was a "public figure" under the Gertz definition.
170. See Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd,
539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977).
171. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
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ed public figures by lower courts, would seem to meet the
Court's standard, since they clearly command enough public
attention to influence public decisions, if they so choose.172
The "special" public figure must actually attempt to affect
the resolution of public questions. Although the Court indicat-
ed that it was necessary to look "to the nature and extent of an
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise
to the defamation,"'173 more than mere submission to the possi-
bility of media exposure is required. The shooting and murder
trial involved in Gertz was widely publicized. Gertz, by agree-
ing to represent the family in the civil action against Nuccio,
voluntarily submitted to the possibility of media exposure. He
did not, however, at any time intentionally seek such exposure
or conduct himself in a manner calculated to attract media
interest.174 Thus, he had made no conscious effort to influence
a public question, and therefore was not a special public figure.175
In the cases decided since Gertz, the lower courts have
172. On the other hand, some decisions since Gertz holding the par-
ticular plaintiff to be a general public figure are quite questionable. See
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 634 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
938 (1974) (plaintiff Carey, general counsel to United Mine Workers,
held to be a public figure "because of the recent focus of public attention
upon the affairs of the United Mine Workers"); Bergman v. Stein, 404
F. Supp. 287, 297 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (private businessman who owned
and operated nursing homes and who became involved in press and state
investigation of nursing home business was said in dictum to be a person
of "general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involve-
ment in the affairs of society" (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 352 (1974)); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal.
App. 3d 938, 946, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975)
(author of new book, How to Be a Party Girl, defamed with reference
to upcoming appearance on television "talkshow"); Basarich v. Ro-
deghero, 24 l. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974) (court
failed to clearly delineate whether high school teachers and athletic
coaches were public officials or public figures but seemed to indicate that
they could be considered both since they were "of as much concern to
the community as are other 'public officials' and 'public figures'"); Kap-
iloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 524, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (high school
principal); James v. Gannett Co., 47 App. Div. 2d 437, 439, 366 N.Y.S.2d
737, 738-39 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834,
386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976) (belly dancer performing in nightclubs). These
decisions can be viewed as either an attempt to protect defendants in
libel actions by a broad construction of "public figure," or, as appears
more likely, simply a failure to perceive the restricted definition of
"public figure" in Gertz.
173. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
174. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 224.
175. The Court apparently has also eliminated the possibility that
a person may become an involuntary public figure. Although Justice
Powell recognized in Gertz that it was "possible for someone to become
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also restricted the special public figure category to persons who
have actively attempted to influence resolution of a public
issue.17 6  Exner v. American Medical Association 77 involved
a physician plaintiff who was an active opponent of water
fluoridation and was allegedly defamed in the American Medical
Association's journal Today's Health. He had written books
and magazine articles, lectured, and litigated on the sub-
ject of fluoridation. The court held that "plaintiff was a public
figure in regard to the limited issue of flouridation by having
abandoned his anonymity, by having assumed leadership and by
having attempted to influence the outcome of the issue."' 78 In
Fram v. Yellow Cab Co.,"79 the plaintiff, president of Peoples
Cab Company of Pittsburgh, was defamed in a television news
program. He had previously appeared before the Pittsburgh
City Council and on the local news to criticize defendant Yellow
Cab and the Public Utilities Commission. A federal court
held that he was a public figure since he had "thrust him-
self into the controversy as he freely and openly criticized the
P.U.C. and Yellow Cab. Like General Walker ... Fram has
thrust his person into the 'vortex' of a public controversy."' 80
In Cera v. Mulligan,'8' the court found that plaintiff chiro-
a public figure through no purposeful action of his own," he also stated
that "instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly
rare." 418 U.S. at 345. The Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976), however, appears to have eliminated even that possibility; it
relied, in part, on plaintiff-respondent Mary Alice Firestone's lack of vol-
untary involvement to hold that she was not a "public figure." Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "respondent [did not]freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life
.... [R] esort to the judicial process ... is no more voluntary in a real-
istic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests
in court." Id. at 454 (emphasis added). This treatment of voluntariness
calls into question the reasoning in cases like Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F.
Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Although the court found in Meeropol that
the plaintiffs, the children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, had been de-
famed in defendant Nizer's book, The Implosion Conspiracy, it granted
defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs were public
figures and had shown no evidence of actual malice. These plaintiffs
were not public figures for all purposes nor had they voluntarily in-
volved themselves in the controversy.
176. The Supreme Court itself used General Walker, the plaintiff in
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), as a benchmark. Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
177. 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).
178. Id. at 224, 529 P.2d at 870.
179. 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
180. Id. at 1334.
181. 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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practors were public figures because they had participated in a
television debate on the virtues of chiropractic medicine.'8 2
The plaintiffs had requested television time to respond to a
&reviously televised film critical of their profession. 83
The special public figure definition is also restricted by the
requirement that the individual be involved in a "public con-
troversy."'1 4  The Supreme Court in Gertz, however, provided
no criteria for identifying a "public controversy," although, in-
terestingly, it criticized Rosenbloom s5 for "forcing state and
federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications
address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not-
182. 79 Misc. 2d at 406, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
183. Id. Other cases in which plaintiffs were found to be public fig-
ures include Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1971)
(major college track coach, allegedly defamed in article appearing in
Newsweek entitled "The Angry Black Athlete"); Hotchner v. Castillo-
Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff, the author
of Papa Hemingway, was defamed in another book about Hemingway
written by a Spanish author; court held that plaintiff "injected himself
into the controversy surrounding the later years of Ernest Hemingway's
life"); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing general language from
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, the court held free-lance writer who had just
published new book on how to keep people from relocating in the sub-
urbs to be a public figure, evidently on the theory that she had thrust
herself into a public controversy); Johnson v. Board of Junior College
Dist. No. 508, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1975) (junior
college professors, defamed in college publication, had become involved
in controversy regarding what textbooks would be used in their courses).
In the following cases, however, the finding that plaintiff was a pub-
lic figure is questionable under the Gertz requirement of voluntary in-
volvement in a public controversy in an attempt to influence the resolu-
tion of public issues: Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196(D.D.C. 1975) (accountant retained by the Committee to Reelect the
President allegedly defamed by wire service story impliedly suggesting
his cooperation in the "laundering" of Committee funds); Jones v. Gates-
Chili News, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 837, 840, 358 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (12 year old youth involved in assault on newsboy characterized
as "voluntarily involved as a participant in a matter of public interest
or concern" and therefore subject to the New York Times standard);
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (county surveyor and paid consultant engineer involved in study
of controversy concerning problem of subdivision flooding).
184. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). Both requirements must be satis-
fied before a plaintiff will be considered a special public figure since his
participation in the event alone is insufficient unless that event can be
labelled a "public controversy."
185. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1424, where he astutely points out
this inconsistency. Eaton cites Exner, Fram, and Cera as support for the
proposition that the "task of determining which publications address
public issues... has been recommitted to the conscience of judges." Id.
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to determine . . . 'what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment.'... We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to
the conscience of judges."'18 6 By adding the requirement of a
"public controversy" to its definition of "public figure" the
Court exacerbated the exact problem it professed to have found'
in Rosenbloom.
Determining what is "of public interest," the relevant in-
quiry under Rosenbloom, is not as arduous as the Court sug-
gests.'8 7 Since publication itself strongly suggests newsworthi-
ness, judges seldom have had difficulty deciding the issue.
Whether a "public controversy" exists, however, is a narrower
and harder question, since much published material will be of
public interest but will not involve a "public controversy."' 88
Insofar as controversy requires contestants, competing views,
and at least the appearance of a problem to be solved, making
this determination will certainly force "judges to decide on an
ad hoc basis which publications address" public controversies.
The difficult decisions the courts must now make are aptly
illustrated by the cases discussed previously, as well as by Fire-
stone itself. In Exner 89 the court had to determine whether
fluoridation was a public issue; 190 in Fram, whether a taxicab
controversy between two cab companies was of general con-
cern; 19 ' and in Cera whether a debate over chiropractics fit the
criteria. 92 Finally, in Firestone the Supreme Court held that
"[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not
the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though
the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be
of interest to some portion of the reading public."' 98 Thus, the
186. 418 U.S. at 346.
187. See text accompanying notes 110-18 supra.
188. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). The Court
distinguished public controversies from matters of public interest in re-
sponse to petitioner Time's argument that because a public controversy
was involved, respondent should be considered a public figure. "[P] eti-
tioner seeks to equate 'public controversy' with all controversies of in-
terest to the public. Were we to accept this reasoning, we would rein-
state the doctrine advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc." Id. See also text accompanying note 193 infra.
189. See text accompanying notes 177-78 supra.
190. 12 Wash. App. at 220, 529 P.2d at 868.
191. Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 (W.D. Pa.
1974).
192. Cera v. Mulligan, 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct.
1974). See also Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356,
1369 (Hawaii 1975), in which the court remanded the case in part for a
determination of whether a "public controversy" was involved.
193. 424 U.S. at 454.
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public controversy requirement strongly suggests that the Court
intended to restrict the public figure category to politically in-
fluential persons, limiting the New York Times protection to
press reports about matters at the core of self-government.
3. Refusal to Grant Special Protection to Reports of Judicial
Proceedings
That the Court meant to confine media coverage and influ-
ence to matters of immediate political significance is also evi-
dent from its rejection of Time's assertion in Firestone that
press coverage of the nation's courts should receive special first
amendment protection.194 Time's argument forced the Court to
directly confront the issue of the role of the press in facilitating
the flow of important information to the public.
Although it often has no immediate political significance,
information about the courts is certainly relevant to self-govern-
ment. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Firestone,
"slight reflection is needed to observe the insistent and complex
interaction between controversial judicial proceedings and pop-
ular impressions thereof and fundamental legal and political
changes in the Nation throughout the 200 years of evolution of
our political system."' 95 Yet the Court rejected Time's argu-
194. Id. at 455-57.
195. Id. at 477-78. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), in which Justice White, writing for the majority, used
the following language to characterize the importance of public knowl-
edge of judicial proceedings and the significance of the press in supply-
ing such information:(I] n a society in which each individual has but limited time and
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of
his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring him
in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great respon-
sibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to renort
fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official
records and documents open to the public are the basic data of
governmental operations. Without the information provided by
the press most of us and many of our representatives would be
unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the admin-
istration of government generally. With respect to judicial pro-
ceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guar-
antee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial
effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.
420 U.S. at 491-92.
Even those who view the first amendment restrictively and would
confine its central meaning to "explicitly political speech" recognize that
it applies to speech concerning governmental proceedings. See Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 25-26 (1971). The Court in Firestone may have taken an even nar-
rower view of the first amendment. "The details of many, if not most,
19 7
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ment on the ground that provision of the safeguard requested
would amount to nothing less than a return to the Rosenbloom
approach.196
Presumptively erecting the New York Times barrier against
all plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries from defamatory
falsehoods published in what are alleged to be reports of judi-
cial proceedings would effect substantial depreciation of the
individual's interest in protection from such harm, without any
convincing assurance that such a sacrifice is required under the
First Amendment.197
This position is inconsistent with the Court's interpretation
of the protection accorded commercial speech by the first
amendment. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,198 a case decided less than three
months after Firestone, the Court held that a Virginia statute
barring the advertisement of prescription drugs violated the first
amendment. In reaching its decision, the Court cited New York
Times, 99 the very case it declined to follow in Firestone. Pub-
lic knowledge of judicial proceedings is certainly more important
than the dissemination of commercial information.2 00 More-
over, the Court's reliance on the need to protect reputations as
the justification for denying special safeguards to reports of ju-
dicial proceedings is particularly suspect in light of Paul v.
Davis.20 1 In that case, decided just before Firestone, the Court
refused to extend due process protections to the reputational
interest and held that simple defamation by a state official did
not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.202 The anomaly
courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward advancing the unin-
hibited debate on public issues thought to provide principal support for
the decision in New York Times." 424 U.S. at 457.
196. Id. at 456. Justice Rehnquist either failed or refused to recog-
nize that petitioner Time was not seeking a return to Rosenbloom
but was simply requesting that the Court carve out a subset of matters
of public interest or concern-reports of judicial proceedings-for special
New York Times protection. Under the argument made by Time, the
actual malice standard would apply to public officials, public figures,
and reports of judicial proceedings. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
197. 424 U.S. at 456.
198. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
199. Id. at 765 n.19.
200. But see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the Court stated: "As to the par-
ticular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information,
that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in
the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
201. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
202. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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of expanding first amendment protection for commercial endeav-
ors, but refusing to grant adequate media protection for reports
of judicial proceedings in the name of "reputation" reinforces
the presumption that the Court was attempting to restrict the
media.
The Court's stated reason for rejecting Time's argument
was that Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn20 3 already pro-
tected the news media. In Cox, a privacy action, the Court had
held that the states could not impose civil liability for the pub-
lication of accurate and truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection. 20 4 Thus, the Firestone
majority declared that the public interest in receiving accurate
information about the courts was protected by Cox, and that
Gertz provided "an adequate safeguard for the constitutionally
protected interests of the press and afford[ed] it a tolerable
margin for error by requiring some type of fault."205
The facts of Firestone, however, indicate that the protec-
tion afforded by the fault standard is inadequate. Despite
Time's reasonable interpretation of the divorce decree,20 6 and
its careful checks and double-checks on the accuracy of its
story, the jury found it liable for defamation.20 7 In the context
of judicial proceedings, "breathing space" for the press is espe-
cially important, both because of the critical public significance
of such proceedings and because the potential for inadvertent
error is large. Legal material is esoteric, filled with technical
rules and confusing jargon which require expertise to inter-
pret.208 Since even competent lawyers frequently misunderstand
the effect of a legal rule or decision, reporters unfamiliar with the
law are much more likely to do so. The finding of liability by
the Florida courts in Firestone, coupled with the Supreme Court's
refusal to review the facts on the negligence issue,209 indicates
203. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The action in Cox was brought by the
father of a rape victim after the broadcast of the name of the deceased
rape victim in a television news report. The appellee, relying on a
Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the
name or identity of a rape victim, sought money damages, claiming his
right to privacy had been invaded.
204. Id. at 491.
205. 424 U.S. at 457.
206. See text preceding note 135 supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 479 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971), rev'd, 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972). See text accompanying
notes 135-40 supra.
208. 424 U.S. at 478-79.
209. See text accompanying notes 139-42 supra.
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that media negligence may be substantially equated with inac-
curacy and that the Gertz fault standard will inadequately pro-
tect media coverage of the nation's courts. The Cox privilege,
limited as it is to truthful accounts, provides no better shield,
for inaccuracy alone may still result in liability. Because the
media will thus be forced to ensure absolute accuracy before
publication, the problem of self-censorship will become acute.
The ultimate effect of the Court's refusal to grant New York
Times protection to reports on judicial proceedings, important
as such reports are to self-government, is that freedom of ex-
pression will be significantly abridged.
IV. CONCLUSION
A careful look at the Supreme Court's professed bases for
distinguishing private individuals from public persons in libel
litigation-access to the media and assumption of the risk of
media coverage-reveals the insubstantial logic underlying the
preferential protection for private persons. The additional safe-
guards that the Court claimed to provide the media-requiring all
plaintiffs to show fault and limiting recovery to actual injury-
are also illusory. These conclusions suggest that instead of
simply striking a new balance between the two established inter-
ests recognized in previous media libel cases, the Court manipu-
lated them to conform to its new policy of media control.
Evidence of the Court's intent to restrict wide-open media
coverage to matters with potential political impact is provided by
the increased protection accorded private individuals, the narrow
definition of "public figure," and the Court's refusal to apply the
New York Times malice standard to reports of judicial proceed-
ings. Preferential treatment for private plaintiffs and the re-
strictive definition of "public figure" assure active media self-
censorship except when .the publication or broadcast involves
a person who may have present or potential political influence,
as measured by an ability to affect, either directly or indirectly,
governmental decisions. The Court's refusal to provide New
York Times protection to reports of judicial proceedings lends
support to this theory because information concerning the op-
eration of the legal system, although ultimately tremendously
important to self-government, is not always of immediate po-
litical relevance.210 Since freedom of speech protects the receipt
210. It should be noted, however, that reports of judicial proceedings
may have as much political significance as media coverage of a person
with general fame or notoriety.
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and dissemination of information as well as the right to speak,2 11
the Court's restriction on what can safely be published or broad-
cast encourages media self-censorship and restricts freedom of
expression.2 12
This conclusion is not contradicted by other recent Supreme
Court decisions that favor the press. In Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornilo,213 the Court struck down a Florida "right of
reply" statute that allowed any candidate for political office
whose personal character was assailed to demand that the paper
print, free of charge, any reply he or she wished to make. The
Court held the statute an unconstitutional infringement of free-
dom of the press.21 4 This holding is compatible with the anal-
ysis presented in this Article, because Tornillo clearly involved
material of imminent political impact, the only category of
press reporting that is sufficiently insulated from libel actions
after Gertz.
The other recent decision is Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart,21 5 a case in which the Court refused to sanction the
imposition of judicial gag orders in the reporting of criminal
proceedings because the defendant had not met his heavy bur-
den of showing potential prejudice and unfairness. 216  Like
Tornillo, this holding is not inconsistent with the analysis of
Gertz and Firestone suggested above. Nebraska Press involved
a prior restraint on the press, a restriction that is much more
direct and invidious than the subtle impact of Gertz and Fire-
stone.
Libel law is an unobtrusive but effective means of control-
ling media power and influence. Unlike direct attempts to
restrict the press, it operates quietly, but its impact is powerful.
The Court's language in Gertz and Firestone does not directly
indicate an intent or attempt to limit media coverage. Neverthe-
less, these decisions will force media self-censorship of material
whose accuracy cannot be verified. While there is nothing
unhealthy in attempting to ensure that information that reaches
the public is truthful and accurate, the mischief is suppressing
211. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976), and cases cited therein.
212. See note 151 supra.
213. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
214. Id. at 256-58.
215. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
216. Id. at 569.
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much accurate and reliable data that does not concern a politi-
cally influential personality or is not absolutely verifiable prior
to publication.
The confused state in which the Supreme Court has left
libel law will undoubtedly magnify the restrictive policies implic-
it in the Gertz and Firestone decisions.2 17 However one may
view the intent behind these decisions, and whether or not one
agrees with the analysis presented above, it is clear that the
Court's recent forays into the area of libel law will have a
debilitating effect on the influence of the press in American
society.
217. Publishers and broadcasters who disseminate their material na-
tionally, for example, must anticipate liability based on negligence since
some states in which their product appears have, after Gertz, adopted
a negligence standard for plaintiffs who are private persons. For deci-
sions that have embraced a negligence standard for private plaintiffs, see
note 59 supra.
